Abstract: An EU Future Internet Engineering project currently underway in Poland defines three parallel internets (PIs). The emerging IIP system (IIPS, abbreviating the project's Polish name), has a four-level architecture, with level 2 responsible for creation of virtual resources of the PIs. This paper proposes a three-tier security architecture to address level 2 threats of unauthorised traffic injection and IIPS traffic manipulation or forging. It is argued that the measures to be taken differ in nature from those ensuring classical security attributes. A combination of hard-and soft-security mechanisms produces node reputation and trust metrics, which permits to eliminate or ostracise misbehaving nodes. Experiments carried out in a small-scale IIPS testbed are briefly discussed.
Introduction
The EU Future Internet (FI) Engineering project currently underway in Poland (named IIP, which abbreviates its Polish name) focuses on the idea of a physical communication substrate shared by three parallel internets (PI), each running a different protocol stack over a set of virtualised links and nodes (Burakowski et al., 2010) . This is in line with existing FI approaches, cf. Anderson et al. (2005) , Fernandes (2011) and Campanella et al. (2010) , and Figure 1(a), where flexibility of resource creation and allocation in a multi-provider environment is a key issue. Among other benefits, the approach of IIP permits to easily tailor currently available network resources to fast-varying user demands, as well as to create virtual networks that can serve traffic of diverse characteristics while minimising their mutual interference. It is important to note that the envisaged PIs need not be confined to IP-based transmission techniques, but can also include post-IP solutions. In fact, two post-IP PIs, named data stream switching (DSS), and content aware network (CAN), are envisaged for IIP besides one named IPv6 QoS that features several QoS-oriented enhancements of IPv6. A testbed embodiment of this idea, called the IIP system (IIPS), is physically based on Ethernet links over which IIPS protocol data units (IIPS-PDUs) are transmitted. In each link, virtual links are created to connect virtual nodes adjacent in a PI topology, with the task of separation of the PIs' traffic and performance left to nodal schedulers. The IIPS architecture consists of four levels [Figure 1(b) ], where level 1 is the physical infrastructure and level 2 is responsible for creation of PI virtual links and nodes. While being a specific design proposal for the FI and serving as an experimental base for the research presented below, IIPS can also be viewed as an abstract FI concept with a reference architecture. In what follows we focus on a few security concerns that this concept raises. Apart from the well-studied security issues related to the exchange of information between multiple virtual machines (VMs) within a single physical node [cf. the main laws of virtualisation security (Lindstrom, 2008) ], one needs to address a number of potentially dangerous networking scenarios, i.e., scenarios only involving inter-node traffic exchange. It seems most natural to locate the underlying security mechanisms at level 2. Figure 1 Virtualisation-based FI, (a) virtual network infrastructure (Fernandes, 2011) (b) IIPS architecture (Burakowski et al., 2010) In particular, this paper addresses two level 2 security concerns. Firstly, an external intruder (outsider) sharing with the IIPS the common physical substrate might manipulate IIPS traffic or inject alien traffic into the IIPS in order to disrupt its functionality. Secondly, a VM implementing a virtual IIPS node can be compromised by an internal intruder (insider) and so is not a trusted entity. In particular, it can forge IIPS traffic to instigate harmful actions or states at an IIPS node. Worse still, an attack upon a single VM in a PI may also affect other PIs. To address these concerns, level 2 security measures are proposed alongside classical perimeter protection and/or protocol-and application specific measures (the latter are applied at the higher levels and so remain outside the scope of this paper). In Section 2, we briefly comment on the existing work on FI security. In Section 3, we characterise level 2 security threats to IIPS and our defence approach. In Section 4, we outline the proposed level 2 security architecture, and in Section 5 compare it to the concept of a secure architecture. The envisaged cooperation of hard-and soft-security mechanisms including local anomaly detection (LAD) (Section 6) and reputation system (Section 7) modules yields time-varying trust metrics for IIPS nodes, which permits to eliminate or ostracise distrusted nodes. We present these mechanisms in some detail with a view of their implementation. Experiments in a small-scale IIPS testbed are discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes this paper.
Current work on FI security
In many FI projects, trust and security appear jointly as an important building block. A common perception is the need for addressing trust and security concerns from a project's initial stages (Gavras et al., 2007) . The FI X-ETP Group (Future Internet -Strategic Research Agenda, 2010) lists security build-up at design time as a key challenge and presents a concept of a trust architecture. Likewise (http://www.syssec-project.eu/), calls for anticipating the emerging threats in the FI and urges work on FI security before they materialise. The 4WARD project (Soellner, 2010) presents a concept of an information-centric architecture with security-aware object identifiers. Effects plus, an FP7 funded coordination and support action (http://www.effectsplus.eu), has been focusing on the analysis of current and earlier trust and security work with the aim of identifying key areas and players. European project websites, e.g., EFII (http://www.initiative.futureinternet.eu) and FIA (European Future Internet Portal, http://www.future-internet.eu) offer references to trust and security-related pages with a work-in-progress status, cf. also http://www.fipedia.org/fipedia/index.php?title=Category:Security. Network and resource virtualisation is present in several FI projects (Soellner, 2010; Flizikowski et al., 2011 ; New Generation Network Architecture: AKARI Conceptual Design, http://akari-project.nict.go.jp/eng/index2.htm). It is also the leading motive of the IIPS. In a promising approach of the NetSE project (Castrucci et al., 2011) , the contemporary Internet migrates towards the FI through the deployment of dedicated software modules called cognitive managers. Each of them is responsible for specific virtual resource abstractions and has an in-built supervisor and security module that among others ensures selected security attributes.
Level 2 security threats and defence approach
A threat is a possibility of damage arising from a specific IIPS vulnerability, and an attack refers to an intruder's activity which exploits this vulnerability. Here, we only address IIPS level 2 security threats and attacks, i.e., related to IIPS traffic over virtual links in a PI topology. External threats relate to generation of fake IIPS traffic or illegal modification of IIPS traffic outside the IIPS. IIPS-PDUs are multiplexed over a common Ethernet infrastructure along with alien traffic, where outsider attacks via VLAN hopping, IIPS-PDU capture or corruption are relatively easy to launch. Their impact depends on the outsiders' capabilities, such as injecting alien PDUs, sensing, buffering and/or modification of IIPS-PDUs; however, with adequate PI perimeter protection, fake or modified IIPS traffic can often be recognised as such. Internal threats are posed by compromised VMs. An insider controlling the VM can spoof a virtual node, forge or modify IIPS-PDUs, and append correct security tags to get the traffic past perimeter protection. This may lead to more serious damage than an outsider can inflict, and not necessarily confined to a single PI. Straightforward attacks are traffic injection, replay/resequencing, ruffling (disruption of IIPS-PDU spacing via IIPS-PDU capture and hold-up) and forging (generation of fake though IIPS-formatted traffic). While the first three mainly induce 'quantitative' harm at an IIPS node (e.g., extra processing effort or a perception of poor inter-PI performance isolation), traffic forging has a 'qualitative' effects -it may disrupt the core functionality of, or create any undesirable state at an IIPS node.
Contemporary security measures are often model-based -they rely on a repository of misuse signatures corresponding to specific vulnerabilities and attacks. In the IIPS, these vulnerabilities and defences are higher-level protocol dependent, thus cannot be addressed by the proposed architecture. On the other hand, symptoms of level 2 attacks are less specific and so harder to capture without an awareness of higher-level protocol semantics. Within a policy-based approach, which we take here, no attempt is made to predict possible attack vectors; instead, anomalous traffic or node behaviour is defined and watched for (we especially relate this to IIPS-PDU contents, timing or sequence, as well as IIPS node state). The proposed security measures prevent an outsider from traffic injection or IIPS traffic modification, and reliably detect traffic replay/resequencing, ruffling and forging. Thus, they differ substantially from classical measures ensuring data authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
Defence tiers
The proposed defence-in-depth architecture features three tiers (Figure 2 ).
1st tier
To block entry of injected, replayed or resequenced traffic, integrity and authentication are assured over each virtual link. The proof-of-concept thrust of our present research does not call for any specific protection mechanism as long as it can work at the speed required by the data plane. We chose to append a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) (Kelly and Frankel, 2007) to all IIPS-PDUs (for an alternative solution, which, in contrast with ours, requires frequent re-authentication, see Zhao et al., 2003) . Each pair of neighbouring virtual nodes share an HMAC key and a IIPS-PDU counter. Both the IIPS-PDU contents (including relevant IIPS headers) and its sequence number are protected, which ensures that any received physical (level 1) frame can be verified as alien traffic or an in-/out-of-sequence IIPS-PDU. In the former case, the frame is dropped and the contents of relevant fields are passed to the 2nd and 3rd tier for further inspection. HMAC constitutes a uniform 1st-tier security measure for the whole IIPS irrespective of the IIPS-PDU format or PI affiliation. Thus, it is not tied to any protocol stack unlike, e.g., IPSec or TLS. To fully utilise a virtual link's data plane bandwidth, both HMAC and IIPS-PDU drop modules are implemented in a four-port netFPGA board (http://www.netfpga.org/). Currently, HMAC-SHA-256 message digest is employed. 
2nd tier
In this tier, to enrich the power of the defence, soft protection methods are applied. For example, ruffling or forging attacks cannot be stopped by HMAC, yet anomalous behaviour they cause can be detected as security-relevant events (SREs) defined by an SRE Filter, e.g., HMAC ordered IIPS-PDU drops, illegal control or management messages, suspicious traffic or resource usage statistics (i.e., ones that depart from normal behaviour profiles learned over long periods of faultless operation), etc. SREs are stored in a LAD database and subjected to analysis by a LAD module implemented within a virtual node's VM code. Based on the common-sense premise that various methods working in conjunction could detect more instances of attacks, we have employed two complementary algorithms: times series analysis (Burgess, 2002) to capture suspicious traffic and resource usage statistics, and data mining via frequent sets (Agrawal and Srikant, 1994) to detect specific patterns in incoming IIPS-PDU flows that may be indicative of attacks. Specifically, while interarrival and service times of incoming IIPS-PDU are relevant for the time series analysis as they may indicate, e.g., a ruffling attack, their contents and semantic relations with formerly arrived IIPS-PDUs are of interest to the data mining, as they may reveal, e.g., forging snmp credentials or ssh password guessing. It is not required that the two algorithms cooperate with each other in any particular way. Rather, we impose a common framework of quantification of detected anomalies, so they can subsequently be reported to the 3rd tier in a uniform fashion.
3rd tier
At a compromised virtual node, LAD need not properly detect and honestly report local anomalies -hence cannot be trusted a priori. Moreover, certain wide-scope attacks would be missed if local-scope SRE and anomaly logs were only analysed; inter-node cooperation is thus required. A local security agent (LSA) at each IIPS virtual node translates the detected anomalies into local reputation metrics to derive the current level of trust that can be placed in that node. LSA reports these metrics, along with the SRE logs, to the PI's master security agent (MSA). For this purpose, a PI-wide multi-agent reputation system is specified using SNMPv3, a cryptographically protected version of the simple network management protocol. In general, a reputation system can be recommendation-or validation-based. The former type has all network management entities (in this case, the LSAs) recommend trust and reputation values in respect of a certain node according to their subjective experience of interactions with that node. Thus second-hand information is often relied upon. In the latter type, trust and reputation values are calculated according to a LSA's own perception of events and the threats they cause. Thus first-hand information is only used. We have decided on the latter type and adopted a centralised approach relying upon MSA for calculation of global trust values. Our approach is insensitive to numerous attacks and inaccuracies arising in recommendation-based reputation systems. Yet, it leaves the LSAs enough freedom in the calculation of local trust and reputation values, which facilitates on-line trust and reputation calculation and prompt reaction to dynamic changes of threat levels. MSA uses a data fusion algorithm to calculate PI-wide reputation and trust metrics of all the virtual nodes and, using a PI-wide anomaly detection (PI-AD) module, captures anomalies of a larger scope. These are made accessible to other IIPS modules, such as routing or management, via an SNMP database. They are also fed back to the nodal LSAs, which can then suitably redefine SRE filters.
Secure versus security architecture
In the FI context, it is worth distinguishing between a secure architecture and a security architecture. The former, exemplified by Castrucci et al. (2011) includes proactive security mechanisms (cognitive managers) built into the data handling and communication software so that no single operation, e.g., connection establishment, identity authentication, packet exchange, route selection, etc., can take place without their consent. Hence, non-conforming behaviour or forbidden network states are prevented. In the clean-slate approach of the internet indirection infrastructure (i3) (Stoica et al., 2004) , point-to-point connections are replaced by a rendezvous scheme, with a receiver having to expressly invite a stream of packets through a distributed lookup service. In the packet level authentication solution (Lagutin, 2010) , nodes verify digital signatures carried by a packet to ensure it is valid and originates from a trusted source. These mechanisms are higher-layer protocol and transmission technique independent; as such they are akin to the IIPS level 2 solution presented above. In contrast, a security architecture combines into a logical whole a set of add-on security mechanisms to enrich a given networking solution that in itself does not address security. The add-on mechanisms are specific to the envisaged threats and possibly deployed in selected network components only. In general, they either prevent some forbidden network states or behaviour, or just detect their occurrence and invoke appropriate reactive procedures. Security architectures are typical of the contemporary internet, IPSec (Kent and Seo, 2005 ) being a prominent example.
To illustrate the above distinction, consider an alternative secure architecture in the spirit of Castrucci et al. (2011) that could have been implemented in IIPS level 2 (Figure 3 ). The analogues of cognitive managers are supervisory sub-modules (the white ovals), built into each functional block of the virtual node (the dark rectangular shape). No matter how successful an intruder is in delivering dangerous traffic to the node, no harmful behaviour or forbidden state can follow unless the whole VM code is compromised. The main difficulty lies in defining all the potentially harmful states and behaviours.
Superimposed on the above alternative secure architecture are the cylindrical shapes that mark our three-tier security architecture. The HMAC modules ensure authenticated and integrity protected communication over a node-to-node virtual link, which alone does not preclude forbidden states or behaviour of other functional blocks. Therefore, they have to be monitored for possible anomalies and non-conformance. The security policy is announced through the LSAs within a trust domain. Based on data gathered from LAD, LSA forms evidence of the current security level at, and in the neighbourhood of, the virtual node it resides in, which it shares with other LSAs within the trust domain. Cooperation between LSAs takes the form of a reputation system; a single trusted entity, MSA, is responsible for combination of security evidence from multiple LSAs. This permits to issue warnings about a virtual node where, due to a malfunction or an attack, an LSA itself violates the security policy. 
Local anomaly detection
Suspicious traffic able to penetrate the 1st tier shall be detected by LAD through checking the semantic patterns in received traffic against the security policy, or through observation of temporal traffic and/or virtual node behaviour. The former uses data mining methods and is suitable against forging attacks targeting specific management and higher-level functionalities; the latter uses time series analysis and protects against ruffling attacks and all-purpose forging attacks such as malicious redirecting of IIPS traffic between the PIs.
Data mining
Target specific forging attacks, e.g., scanning, (D)DoS or malware/spam outbreaks, produce repetitive patterns in observed sequences of SREs. The allowed sources of SREs are local firewall or HMAC ordered IIPS-PDU drop data and errors reported by the local SNMP agent and SSHD daemon, e.g., unauthorised resource or account access attempts. An SRE is represented as a set of relevant SRE features, e.g., offending IPv6 address, used protocol or port identifiers. An SRE related to a reported SNMP error can have the form (sourceIPv6 = 2001:db8:201::3, user name = management, SNMP action = denied, OID = 1.3, …), where OID is the SNMP database object identifier. SRE logs are analysed in successive time windows in search of frequent sets (Agrawal and Srikant, 1994) , i.e., subsets of features found abnormally frequent, as dictated by the minimal support parameter. E.g., a time window of 10 s and the minimal support of 4 mean that any pattern of features repeated at least four times over 10 s raises an anomaly alarm. If, for example, a discovered frequent set contains a source address then a report sent to LSA via a secure SNMP message indicates the culprit node. E.g., the nmap scanning attack, used to discover services running on a victim machine, can manifest itself as a frequent set {type = security policy violation, sourceIPv6 = 2001:db8:201::3, destination IPv6 = 2001:db8:201::3, packet length = 1,080, used protocol = TCP}. The lack of features related to source and destination ports indicates that in the current time window they have taken diverse values, as expected in a scanning attack. An anomaly has two attributes on a scale from 0 to 1: severity, a measure of the anomaly's adverse impact, and probability, a measure of conviction that the anomaly indeed indicates a security threat. (Note that the term 'probability' is used here in its axiomatic sense.) For preliminary experiments described in Section 7, arbitrary severity and probability values reflect typical threat occurrences, e.g., 0.05 and 0.5 for low-impact anomalies, 0.3 and 0.7 for probable software configuration errors, and 1 and 1 for (D)DoS attacks. Future research is expected to fine-tune such assignments.
In a prototype of the IIPS described further, the above analysis is performed both locally at a node, by the LAD module, and globally, by the PI-AD module. Local analysis is mainly devoted to detection of 'brutal' attacks, generating vast amounts of SREs, e.g., scanning of a large number of user accounts on a victim machine via the SSH protocol within a short timeframe. Data for analysis is taken directly from all locally available SRE sources. In contrast, the PI-AD module's main function is associated with detection of stealth attacks, which are dispersed either temporally or spatially (i.e., proceed very slowly or target multiple machines). For this purpose, each LAD finds SREs that do not support detected frequent sets, that is, are not supersets of the frequent sets. Consider an example where a victim machine is simultaneously scanned by two attackers. The first attacker sends many attempts during the time period when the analysis is performed, whereas the second only sends one. Detection of frequent sets reveals one pattern associated with the first attacker. All detected SREs, except the one associated with the second attacker, are supersets of the detected frequent set, and are of no interest for the PI-AD analysis. The remaining SRE is transferred directly to the PI-AD module, which performs frequent set detection in a longer timeframe. As a result, slow scanning performed by the second attacker will be detected. In general, any attack targeting multiple IIPS nodes will be detected even if in each of them evil activity eludes detection.
An additional mechanism built in the LAD module reduces the data volume to be analysed by the PI-AD module by filtering out many SRE related to easily detected 'brutal' attacks. This is especially important when PI-AD is configured for detection of very slow attacks (which implies data aggregation over longer periods) and performs this functionality for many nodes.
Time series analysis
LAD also checks for anomalies in an IIPS node's behaviour regarding memory and CPU usage, per-PI received and transmitted traffic volume, etc. Abnormally high CPU usage or received traffic volume are typical of DoS (in particular, traffic injection) or all-purpose forging attacks, whereas traffic ruffling creates abnormal statistics of traffic bursts. First, relevant behavioural features are selected. Next, historical (training) selected feature values are compared to the current ones to learn how indicative the latter are of possible anomalies. Upon iterating the above steps, anomalies are indicated by discrepancies between the statistics of the current feature values and those derived from training data.
The anomaly detection algorithm takes as input the time series of feature values in successive time windows, denoted x 1 ,…, x l ,… Following Burgess (2002) , the severity of an anomaly accompanying the observation of x l is calculated as
where x P,l and σ P,l (x T,P,l and σ T,P,l ) are, respectively, the current exponential moving average and standard deviation of the time subseries composed of arithmetic averages
P and T being predefined integers. P is the characteristic period of the system behaviour and in many real systems corresponds to a day length. T is the time span of the system history that we consider significant for anomaly detection and typically corresponds to one-month system monitoring. Note that for a current feature value close to both averages the severity is close to 0, whereas deviations treble the corresponding standard deviations indicate a maximum severity. The anomaly probability is the proportion of observations yielding distinctly positive severities. (Note that this time the term 'probability' is used in its empirical sense.) As an illustration, artificially generated received traffic of 5,000-byte IIPS-PDUs, with Pareto distribution of inter-arrival times with mean 15 ms and standard deviation 75 ms, is regarded as typical and produces zero-severity observations. (In all experiments, the D-ITG (http://www.grid.unina.it/software/ITG/) traffic generation platform was used.) After 20 LAD time windows, an extra stream of 500-byte IIPS-PDUs with normally distributed inter-arrival times with mean 20 ms and standard deviation 5 ms is superimposed. As a result, the severity and probability values increase. If the change of the traffic pattern is permanent, LAD eventually learns it and returns to zero severities, as is the case in Figure 4 . Were the extra traffic to vanish after another 30 LAD time windows, modelling a short-term ruffling attack, the period of non-zero severity and probability values would roughly double in length. 
Proposed reputation system
The proposed PI-wide multi-agent reputation system has LSAs communicate with MSA in successive reporting intervals. Local trust metrics derived by LSAs are reported to MSA, which converts them into global (PI-wide) trust and reputation metrics. These are accessed by other IIPS modules, e.g., routing or management, and used to identify and/or ostracise ill-reputed nodes. They are also fed back to LSAs to modify local SRE filters, i.e., update the security policy, and to enable LSAs to act as backup MSA in case the original MSA itself is disrupted by an attack. R ∈ is the current reputation metric of virtual node i (initially set to 1). MSA then calculates new reputation metrics for the (n + 1) th reporting interval:
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the learning constant applied to the reputation history. Note the conservative approach: reputation decreases immediately as dictated by diminished trust, but increases somewhat more reluctantly. The process of reputation calculation is sketched in Figure 5 . In preliminary testing and analyses reported in the next section, the α and β have been set to the same value 0.5, which yielded resilience to most known attacks on reputation systems (Hoffman et al., 2009 ).
Testbed description and test results
Since HMAC protects against injected (unauthorised) traffic, we present sample proof-of-concept tests of the 2nd-and 3rd-tier security modules, i.e., foiling forging and ruffling attacks. A small-scale PI testbed is shown in Figure 6 . Three IIPS virtual nodes named Node 1, Node 2 and Node 3 host LSAs; a fourth one hosts MSA. They are controlled by a Xen virtualisation engine (Egi et al., 2007) and communicate over IPv6 using SNMPv3. 
The cooperation of the security mechanisms
In the experiments, the focus was on the cooperation of the security mechanisms rather than on the feasibility of specific attacks. Therefore, SREs were only derived from ip6table firewall logs, which were checked for symptoms of forging attacks, and from HMAC data and received traffic volume, which were checked for symptoms of injection and ruffling attacks. In the former case, severity and probability values were adjusted to produce adequate response to the attacks, whereas in the latter, they were calculated based according to Section 5. The reporting interval was 15 s.
Generic attacks by one or more nodes
The first scenario validates the reputation system's ability to make proper use of the reputation weights as expressed by (2). In Figure 7 , Node 2 starts attacking Node 3 at time T0. LAD at Node 3 classifies this as an attack with probability 0.8 and severity 0.9. LSA at Node 3 then reports to MSA the trust metric of Node 2. As a result, Node 2's global trust metric decreases instantly to 55% of the maximum, and remains so until time T1, when Node 2 also attacks Node 1. This is detected by LAD at Node1 and causes Node 2's global trust metric to drop to about 10%. Since Node 2 keeps attacking, its trust metric remains low. Meanwhile, Node 1 starts a short-term attack. At time T2, the now distrusted Node 2 reports to MSA an attack from Node 1, but this report has minimal influence upon Node 1's trust metric. However, when both Node 2 and Node 3 report an attack from Node 1 at time T3, Node 1's trust metric decreases rapidly. This is because Node 3's trust (hence, also reputation) metric remains at the maximum and MSA now weights reports about Node 1's attacks much higher. When Node1's short-term attack is over, its trust and reputation metrics start increasing. 
Scanning attacks
The following experiments demonstrate the reputation system's resilience to various degrees of self-moderation by an intruder who wants to stay undetected. In Figure 8 (a), Node 1 attacks Node 3 between times T0 and T1. Node 1 floods Node 3 with IIPS-PDUs performing an nmap scanning attack (one giving symptoms similar to a DoS). LAD at Node3 correctly classifies this as an attack with severity 1 and probability 1. MSA receives repeated reports from Node 3, hence Node 1's reputation metric decreases instantly to about 62%. 
In Figure 8 (b), Node 1 performs a sophisticated scanning attack: after each connection termination it pauses for 1,000 ms by executing nmap -6 --scan-delay 1000 Node3. LAD at Node 3 reports the attack severity 0.1 and probability 0.05. MSA again receives repeated reports, so Node 1's reputation and trust metrics decrease throughout the attack, averaging 64% and ranging from 62% to (very briefly) 92%. In Figure 8 (c), Node 1 tries a pause duration of 1,500 ms (a moderate scanning attack). LAD at Node 3 detects an attack of severity 0.1 and probability 0.5. The global trust metrics throughout the attack average 71% and range from 65% to 93%, behaving steadily most of the time. The chart for Node 1 does not differ visibly from Figure 8 under a lazy scanning attack with pause durations of 3,000 ms. In this case, Node 1's global trust metric average rises to 85%, permitting Node 1 to retain the 'benefit of the doubt', but also reflecting the limited impact of the attack.
Additional conducted tests are associated with new data source (SRE generated by an SSH daemon), and PI-AD functionality that allows detection of temporally and spatially dispersed attacks. In what follows, detailed description of such attacks and their detection is presented.
Detection of spatially dispersed attacks
In this experiment, we test the ability to aggregate logs gathered by LSAs at different nodes in the PI-AD module. Listing 1 presents a simple expect script used during the experiment, which tries one user and password pair at each node present in the testbed of Figure 6 . The spawn keyword creates a new SSH session to the attacked machine using a non-existent user. Subsequently, the SSH client is expected to send a password keyword, whereupon one-second delay is introduced and a simulated wrong password (using the wrongpass phrase) is sent. Analogous steps are performed for other nodes involved in this experiment.
Listing 1
Sample expect script that simulates SSH scanning of the same login and password pair at various machines Due to the specific attack configuration, each victim machine generates only one SRE, which is insufficient for LSA to detect and raise an anomaly alert. However, all such SREs are transferred to PI-AD, and after aggregation a frequent set that specifies this attack is detected. The effect is that PI-AD detects a PI-wide anomaly, which decreases the trust metric associated with the offending node Node 1, cf. Figure 9 . After the attack targeting all the nodes of our testbed, the offending node's trust metric decreases to 97%.
This relatively slight decrease is caused by the small number of nodes in our testbed, whose combined SRE data only produce an anomaly with a relatively low severity and probability, respectively 0.2 and 0.5. During this experiment, the LAD module sets support to 5, which prevents LAD from detecting an attack in the 2nd tier, and causes an SRE to be sent to PI-AD. PI-AD sets support to 3, which is the number of attacked machines.
Figure 9
Calculated trust metric during a distributed SSH attack aimed at three nodes detected by PI-AD (see online version for colours)
A similar attack targeting the SNMP service is performed by shell scripts presented in Listing 2 and Listing 3. These two scripts simulate simple scanning for known SNMP credentials. The first script simulates a situation where the attacker gathers SNMP data using wrong credentials, probably stolen from some other source. The attacker uses a wrong encryption key privkey2. Other parameters used by the pysnmpget tool set SNMP version to 3, set user name, enable message authentication, and set appropriate authentication key (-A authkey1). Scripts takes one command line parameter − node name − which during execution is substituted at token $1. Because the SNMP daemon expects privkey1, execution of this script leads to the generation of SRE events on a victim machine. The second script tries the same attack targeting multiple machines and using node names instead of $1 variable. Due to a relatively small number of packets used by pysnmpget, LSA at each node cannot detect an attack and sends a relevant SRE to PI-AD.
Listing 2
Sample shell script used for gathering data using some wrong credentials #!/bin/sh pysnmpget -O Qv -v3 -u test-user -l authPriv -A authkey1 -X privkey2 $1:1061 REPUTATION-MIB::reputation.1
Listing 3
Sample shell script used for attacking various nodes
./attack02.sh node2
./attack02.sh node3 Figure 10 presents the trust metric of the offending Node 1 during this attack. In comparison to the previous figure, the decrease in the trust metric is more pronounced. This is caused by the employed pysnmpget tool, which in the case of failure sends four requests. As a result, the trust metric of the attacker temporarily drops to 73%. 
Detection of temporally dispersed attacks
This experiment demonstrates PI-AD's ability to aggregate data associated with attacks that are intentionally slowed down by the attackers in order to confuse the detection algorithm. For this purpose, PI-AD not only aggregates data from multiple nodes, but also stores them for a configurable time period. The expect script used in this experiment is very similar to the previous one, the only differences consist in the use of one victim node and an additional delay meant to slow down the attack. As before, no LSA detects the attack, which, however, does get detected by PI-AD. Figures 11 and 12 show the resulting decrease in the trust metric of the offending Node 1 and Node 2. Figure 11 presents a situation where attacker checks one password and times out for 30 seconds. In this case the attacker's trust metric is reduced to a constant 73%. Figure 12 shows the trust metric of an attacker that uses a 60-second timeout. In this case, the reduced trust metric is slightly higher and fluctuates between 86% and 92%. 
Synergy of time series and data mining anomaly detection
Since our IIPS security architecture combines two types of anomaly detection algorithms, it can benefit from this heterogeneity to detect a large variety of attacks targeting IIPS nodes. The goal of the experiments discussed below is to investigate the similarities of, and differences between the effects of the time series analysis and data mining approaches to anomaly detection. However, the most important result of these experiments is that both these approaches are complementary; when combined, they may add value to IIPS security.
In the experiments, time series LAD is used to monitor the behaviour (more precisely, the number of sent and received bytes) of Node 2 in the testbed of Figure 6 . The first experiment consists in the observation of Node 2 performing the attack specified in Listing 1. As each execution of SSH logging brings about some additional traffic, it can be noticed that the outgoing traffic pattern at Node 2 changed throughout the attack. Accordingly, LAD notifies MSA about a detected anomaly and as a result, the trust metric of Node 2 decreases ( Figure 13 ). The behaviour of time series LAD is in this case very similar to PI-LAD since it aggregates the information about Node 2's actions. The similar reaction to them of two IIPS security modules: LAD and PI-AD, shows the potential synergy within the security architecture, leading to a reduction of false positives. Since a single node trust effect is very slight an individual LAD usually omits the anomaly detection while in data aggregated by PI-LAD (which analyses consolidated information obtained from all LADs) an attack effect can be detected. The next experiment was similar to the previous one, except the SSH attack was persistent and aimed at a single node, cf. Listing 4. In the do/done loop, SSH login to user account at Node 1 is repeated 100 times with wrong passwords (in this case consecutive integer numbers are sent as passwords). Wrong logins are generated with a constant frequency of one per second. This script simulates failures in SSH logins similarly as in Listing 1, the use of loop being the only difference.
Listing 4
Sample expect script that simulates SSH scanning using various login at a single node In Figure 14 , the final impact of Node 2 attacks against Node1, measured as the decrease of Node 2 trust metric, is distinctly more visible than in Figure 13 . It is worth noticing that the time series-based LAD can correctly detect SSH scanning even if the scanning actions are executed at random intervals (the sleep 1 line from the previous script has been modified to sleep $RANDOM), cf. Listing 5 and Figure 15 . Another attack targeting SNMP services is performed by the shell script presented in Listing 6. It relies on the fact that SNMP authentication is somewhat simplistic -in its earlier versions credential information is sent through the network as a plaintext. SNMP management information base (MIB) data can be retrieved from a device by specifying the correct read community string. On the other hand, SNMP MIB data can be written to a device using the correct write community string. MIB contains object identifier (OID) values, such as routing table entries, network statistics, and details of network interfaces, which can be very useful for an intruder. Accessing them is instrumental in performing further network reconnaissance and mapping. A tool often employed by intruders and security consultants alike for brute-forcing SNMP community strings and accessing MIB databases is snmpwalk. The script in Listing 6 can be used for an effective SNMP community string brute-force attack. There are two for-loops. The inner loop generates snmpwalk request. This is a command implemented by Net-SNMP which allows to retrieve a subtree of management values using SNMP GETNEXT requests. Moreover, when used with a valid community string, snmpwalk allows for downloading the entire MIB database from the target device. The outer loop just introduces delays between two consecutive snmpwalk requests. As the snmpwalk command generates significant amount of data transmitted out of the node, it can easily be noticed by the local time series analysis LAD as an abrupt change of the output traffic profile, which results in a decrease of the node's trust metric, cf. Figure 16 . The last performed experiment aims to simulate a simple flooding attack using ICMP packets, cf. Listing 7. The presented shell script executes Unix ping command several times with different input parameters -s which specify the packet size (5,000, 10,000, 20,000 and 30,000 bytes). The switch -c specifies the number of ICMP packets to be sent in each line.
Listing 7
Shell script used for a flooding attack The ping flood is a well-known and widely used simple denial-of-service attack where the intruder overwhelms the victim machine with IIPS-PDUs being ICMP Echo Request (ping) packets. This is most effectively accomplished by using the flood option of ping, which sends ICMP packets at the highest possible rate without waiting for replies. The intruder expects that the victim will respond with ICMP Echo Reply packets, thereby reducing the available bandwidth of its network connection as well as its computational resources. The ICMP Echo Request packets were used in this example just to illustrate the general impact of DoS attacks upon time series analysis LAD. As can be noticed in Figure 17 , the results of detection are very similar to those obtained in the previous experiment (cf. Figure 16) . As a rule, time series analysis LAD is mainly responsive to the volume of traffic exchanged between network nodes and not the traffic type (e.g., ICMP, SNMP, SSH).
One conclusion from the experiments briefly discussed above is that the IIPS security architecture, which combines the data mining techniques and time series-based analysis, shows a 'positive' synergy in that the implemented algorithms jointly cover a much wider range of possible security-related incidents compared to each of them separately. The time series algorithm is 'context independent', i.e., it reacts whenever the successive values of a monitored feature exhibit a deviation from a previously established rule. In particular, the time series algorithm detects attacks independently of the communication protocol used. On the other hand, the well-defined context of security attacks, which the data mining algorithms take into account, reduces the number of false-positive alarms. Finally, upon a reaction of both these types of algorithms, there is only a small risk that the value of the nodal trust metric reported by the local IIPS security module will be inaccurate.
Conclusions
We have proposed a security architecture for the IIPS, a FI system where several PIs coexist over common physical transmission infrastructure owing to link and node virtualisation. Security threats have been pointed out that arise from physical link sharing by IIPS and non-IIPS users, as well as from traffic possibly originated at compromised virtual nodes. This calls for security measures different in nature from those addressed by classical security attributes such as data confidentiality, authentication or nonrepudiation. A case has been made for a three-tier security architecture featuring HMAC, anomaly detection, and virtual node reputation and trust evaluation mechanisms. Sample test results, obtained from a small-scale PI with a repertoire of nodal misbehaviour, have been discussed and demonstrated to create adequate response to level 2 security threats. As a subject of future work, the key parameters of the employed algorithms are going to be fine-tuned in a systematic way, and the proposed architecture is going to be tested against a full scope of known low-level attacks.
